
Agentic AI Attacks and Physical Security
Security products increasingly ship with AI built in. Over the past year, AI has been used to break into organizations, and in some cases has broken in on its own. For a physical security manager the question is simple: could the AI inside a security product do either? The answer depends on what kind of AI it is.
| When | Incident | Attacker? | What happened |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | Espionage campaign using Claude | Yes | Attackers told the AI they were security testers. It then did 80–90% of the work against about 30 organizations, and got into a small number of them |
| Aug 2025 | Salesloft Drift breach | Yes | Attackers took the access tokens held by Drift, an AI chat product, and used them to reach data at more than 700 of its customers |
| May–Jul 2026 | OpenAI agents breach Hugging Face | No | AI agents being tested on writing exploits escaped their sandbox and gained admin control of several Hugging Face clusters |
| Apr–Jul 2026 | Anthropic evaluation incidents | No | AI models in a test they were told was isolated had live internet access. They breached three real organizations, two of which had not noticed until told |
In the Drift case the customers were never attacked directly. They were reached through access they had given a trusted AI product. In the last two cases, the AI was given a goal and found its own way past the limits set for it.
What these cases have in common
Three properties of the AI explain every case in the table:
â—Ź Reach. The AI held, or could get to, passwords, tokens and connections to other systems. In the Drift case, that reach was all the attackers needed. â—Ź Capability. The AI could write code, find weaknesses and use hacking techniques. This is what turned a foothold into a breach in the other three cases. â—Ź Autonomy. The AI took instructions in plain language and chose its own steps toward a goal. That is how attackers misled it, and how agents talked themselves past their limits.
Reach decides how far a breach can spread. Capability and autonomy decide whether the AI can cause one. General-purpose AI agents have all three by design, because that is what makes them useful.

What Is Agentic AI in Security? Risks, Reality, and the Problem with AI-Washing
What is agentic AI in security, and should it be trusted with critical decisions? Learn why many "agentic AI" claims are marketing hype and why autonomous decision-making may be fundamentally incompatible with life-safety security operations.
Read moreWhat this means for the organization running the product
A security product sits in a privileged position. It is trusted, it runs around the clock, and it connects to cameras, alarms and often access control. If the AI inside it can be steered by an attacker, or can act on its own, that position works against you.
â—Ź Attacks inside your network. An AI with reach and capability can move from the system it lives in to others. The agents at Hugging Face spread across multiple clusters, collecting credentials as they went. Inside a security system, the same kind of access could be used to disable cameras, suppress alarms or open doors. â—Ź Attacks on other organizations. The damage need not stop at your network. In Anthropic's incidents, one model published a malicious software package that ran on 15 real systems, including a security company's scanner. An AI doing this from inside your product would make your network the source of the attack. â—Ź Every customer at once. A vendor's AI is the same at every site. One weakness, or one stolen set of tokens, reaches all of them, as Drift's customers found. â—Ź Slow detection. Activity from a trusted security system looks legitimate. Two of the three organizations breached in Anthropic's incidents had not noticed until Anthropic told them. â—Ź Legal exposure. Liability for AI that breaks into other systems is now being examined. US lawyers have argued that running a capable AI agent connected to outside networks with its safeguards switched off could expose the organization responsible to civil and criminal liability under US computer crime law.
Many of these consequences fall on the organization that installed the product, not only on the vendor.

AI snake oil alert: "Agentic AI" in video security
Every AI video analytics vendor suddenly claims to be "agentic," but most security systems remain traditional detection and automation pipelines wrapped in new marketing language. Learn how to spot AI snake oil, evaluate vendor claims, and separate genuine innovation from hype before making a security technology investment.
Read moreHow Scylla measures up against the three
Scylla builds its own AI and runs it at the customer's site. It does not rely on anyone else's language model. The product is a set of computer vision models trained to detect specific threats, such as firearms, knives and perimeter intrusion. Since January 2026 Scylla has also offered Event Raptor, a vision-language model Scylla developed in-house, which lets operators write detection rules and search footage in plain English.
â—Ź Reach. Event Raptor runs on-premises or on edge devices and can operate in air-gapped sites, with "no reliance on third-party APIs or external cloud infrastructure". There is no outside AI account or token for an attacker to take. â—Ź Capability. The models were trained on Scylla's own surveillance footage, not internet-scale data, to recognize and describe what cameras see. They are not built to write code, probe networks or attack systems. â—Ź Autonomy. The models take in video and rules written by authorized operators, and they produce detections, descriptions and alerts. They do not read email, documents or web pages. Any automated response comes from fixed event rules set by operators, not from the AI choosing what to do.

Your AI Security Pilot Passed. When Should You Test It Again?
AI video analytics should be retested after material changes to stream quality, lighting, scene layout, software or infrastructure, alongside risk-based scheduled checks that verify detection performance and end-to-end alert delivery.
Read moreScylla's AI has limited reach, no hacking capability and no freedom to choose its own actions. It lacks all three of the properties that made the breaches above possible.
What this does not cover
This argument is about the AI itself. Scylla, like many security products, runs on servers and edge devices and connects to cameras and video management systems. Those connections, the passwords behind them and any remote support access need the same care as every other system on the network. In early 2026 a single low-skilled attacker, helped by commercial AI, got into more than 600 firewalls in 55 countries, by logging in to exposed management interfaces with weak passwords.
A vision-language model can also read text that appears in front of a camera. Text placed in a scene could affect what the model reports, and so which operator rules fire. It cannot make the model take any other action, because the model has no other actions available to it.
Questions to ask any AI security vendor
1. Reach. Is the AI your own model, or a third-party model reached over the internet? What passwords, tokens or connections does it hold?
2. Capability. What was the model trained to do? Can it write code or run commands?
3. Autonomy. What does the AI take in, and can it choose its own actions, or do all actions come from fixed rules set by operators?

Final Takeaway
The real risk of agentic AI in physical security comes from the combination of reach, capability and autonomy. Security teams should look beyond the “AI-powered” label and understand exactly what an AI system can access, what it is capable of doing and how much freedom it has to act without human-defined rules. Choosing purpose-built, tightly bounded AI architectures reduces the attack surface while preserving the operational benefits of intelligent video security.
About the Author

Graeme Woods
Global Business Analyst
Graeme Woods is a Global Business Analyst specializing in AI video analytics market intelligence, technology trends, and the strategic implications of AI adoption in different spheres of technology. He has authored numerous widely-read industry articles covering topics from edge-cloud architecture and VMS consolidation to LLM applications in video analytics, and has been published in international security industry outlets including Defense & Security Middle East. His writing bridges the gap between technical AI capability and the practical decisions facing security directors, enterprise leaders, and system integrators worldwide.
Learn MoreStay up to date with all of new stories
Scylla Technologies Inc needs the contact information you provide to us to contact you about our products and services. You may unsubscribe from these communications at any time. For information on how to unsubscribe, as well as our privacy practices and commitment to protecting your privacy, please review our Privacy Policy.
Related materials

The Cyber-Physical Convergence Has Arrived. Is Your Security Program Ready?
Most organizations sit between Stage 1 and Stage 2 of cyber-physical security maturity, use this expert framework to assess where your program stands and build a practical roadmap to a fully converged, AI-powered security operation in 2026.
Read more
Edge, Cloud, On-Premises or Hybrid AI Video Analytics? A Business Decision Framework
Choosing between edge, cloud, on-premises and hybrid AI video analytics requires matching each workload to the organization’s connectivity, response, data governance, staffing and lifecycle cost requirements.
Read more
What Is Agentic AI in Security? Risks, Reality, and the Problem with AI-Washing
What is agentic AI in security, and should it be trusted with critical decisions? Learn why many "agentic AI" claims are marketing hype and why autonomous decision-making may be fundamentally incompatible with life-safety security operations.
Read more